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The problem of "the divine" is a central theme in 
much of modern philosophy. Like Kant, Hume, and Hegel, 
Nietzsche accounts for various beliefs within the con-
text of his philosophy, i.e., the philosophy of Will to 
Power. Will to Power is all of whatever is. The es-
sence of Will to Power is the will to more and more 
power. Will to power has no identity; it is not an ob-
ject, not a substance, and not a thing-in-itself. It 
simply becomes; it revolves chaotically. Yet "it" does 
not run off into dispersion and nothingness, for within 
"its" chaos are qualities binding becoming and res-
training chaos, that is, qualities that guide Will to 
Power's will to (more of) "itself." These qualities 
measure the differences and likenesses, the strengths 
and weaknesses between quanta of power. These quali-
ties Nietzsche calls values. Will to Power has no 
goal, no final state. Man, however, is not identical 
with Will to Power's chaos. He is unique. He sets 
goals, for he seeks to order his chaos by giving mean-
ing to his life. 
Nietzsche's notion of "the divine" is neither secu-
lar nor theological; it is solely philosophical. 
Reverence is an essential disclosure of man's will(s) 
to power. Man experiences "the divine" as that which 
is the most powerful, the mightiest, and the source of 
human powerfulness and meaning. The mightiest is what 
Nietzsche means by "the divine." Hence, man needs to 
experience divinity so as to have a measure to guide 
his struggle to attain order in life's chaos. For 
Nietzsche, therefore, "the divine" measures man's 
strength. The "Greeks used their gods precisely so as 
to ward off the 'bad conscience', so as to be able to 
rejoice in their freedom of soul." 1 
The problem is, thus, not that this need should be 
extinguished. Of course, it can be extinguished. The 
religious instinct (der religiose Instinkt) may grow or 
wilt. The Last Man, happy with inertia, laughs at the 
Madman's cry that "God is Dead." However, the Last Man 
is the greatest danger to the earth precisely because 
he will not look beyond himself. Thus, Nietzsche is 
not arguing that the religious instinct be extin-
guished, but rather that with the death of the old God, 
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the religious instinct be rekindled by a new experience 
of divinity. Nietzsche has an experience of "the 
divine," 2 and it is the theoretical explication of this 
experience which motivates and frames his evaluation of 
devotedness. Within this evaluation he asks whether 
the various types of beliefs about God hinder or help 
man. What do mankind's valuations of godliness mean? 
As is well known, Nietzsche delivers a critique of 
the highest values of mankind. Man, the locus of oppo-
sites within Will to Power, guides his conflicting 
will(s) to power by values. Values are man's means for 
creating order out of chaos and giving himself meaning. 
Man is both the evaluator and the creator of values. 
Values set his goals. The highest values in history 
are to date, moral, and the greater part of morality is 
robed in sacred attire. This is so even though "in it-
self, religion has nothing to do with morality." 1 
Valuation of "the divine" procribes the goal for "man." 
However, man has not yet reached his goal; indeed, he 
is a long way from it. And, in such notions as guilt, 
these so-called highest, "godly," and moral values have 
generated the antithesis to man's vitality and fulfill-
ment. For example, the misinterpretation of suffering 
as guiltiness undermines man's needs to increase power. 
Again, the belief in another world is supposed to ex-
plain the meaning and goal of this life by determining 
the value of this life according to a better, 'truer' 
world. In denying value to this life in itself, how-
ever, such an answer begs the question of life's mean-
ing; it fails to explain man's earthly sojourn. Since 
most of religion and morality devalue man's power, most 
worship and piety signify a loss of vitality for man. 
Man loses power worshipping a moral view of "God" that 
opposes human strength. These sacred values are 
decadent. They dissipate rather than integrate man's 
power. In answering the question "What for?" through 
weakness and weariness, Nietzsche calls these values 
passively nihilistic. They devalue the values of power 
increment along with whatever is natural, spontaneous, 
earthly. They over-tame and over-civilize man, sup-
pressing and devitalizing his instincts. This nihil-
istic scale of values is inadequate to the worth of 
man's unique destiny. It insufficiently estimates the 
measure of man's power in relation to divinity. 
Knowledge of valuation is the task of Nietzsche's 
philosophy. In particular, this knowledge of the mean-
ing of sacred values is disclosed through a series of 
analyses. Each analysis entails a different kind of 
nihilism, i.e., a different style of valuation. Nihi-
lism is the normal condition of man (for man values 
life, which as a whole cannot be valued). Thus, 
Nietzsche first gives an elaborate genealogy of reli-
gions in general. This uncovers how many interpreta-
tions of "the divine" imply passive nihilism, a 
"decline and recession of the power of the spirit."* 
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Second, he unfolds a typology of pious personalities. 
This reveals the multiple interpretations of "the 
divine" in terms of the genetically created symbols of 
Theos, and it then ranks these symbols according to 
instincts. Religious instincts, as the need man has 
for "the divine," are the conditions for the possibil-
ity of interpreting the meaning of divinity. Their 
ranking is the methodology of active nihilism; Nietz-
sche's hammer. Finally, through extreme nihilism, a 
radical revaluation of "the divine" articulates itself 
in the notion of Overman, Eternal Recurrence, and 
Dionysus. I shall now discuss briefly each of these 
analyses. 
I. The Genealogy 
Man experiences divinity by way of his instinctual 
needs. Within society man internalized his instincts. 
He thus focused his values away from mastering external 
life and towards mastering internal life vis-a-vis 
consciousness. This was a leap. Man went to war with 
himself. Consciously and unconsciously, he became a 
collection of confliciting will(s) to power. He sought 
meaning in a meaningless world. So religion came to 
fulfill the human need for divine spectators who took 
great interest in this most interesting animal, man. 
Put differently, man needed "the divine" both to wit-
ness as well as to vindicate the drama of his suffer-
ing, his courage, and his struggle for order in the 
face of a chaotic world. "The divine" fulfilled man's 
special need for meaning; it expressed his very unique-
ness, his created order from chaos. 
The existence on earth of an animal soul turned 
against itself, taking sides against itself, was 
something so new, profound, unheard of, enig-
matic, contradictory, and pregnant with a future 
that the aspect of the earth was essentially 
altered. Indeed, divine spectators were needed 
to do justice to the spectacle that thus began 
and the end of which is not yet in sight—a spec-
tacle too subtle, too marvelous, too paradoxical 
to be played senselessly unobserved on some ludi-
crous planet!"* 
Genealogically, Nietzsche shows that man has given 
various interpretations to "the divine." First, man 
interprets "the divine" with fear; later "the divine's" 
presence is felt with ennobling piety during the inter-
mediate stage of the nobles. The nobles understood 
their gods to be spontaneous, to ward off "bad 
conscience" and ressentiment, and to justify and make 
acceptable human life with all its uncertainty. With 
the victory of the Slave Revolt of Morality, however, 
man perceives "the divine" as the sanctification of 
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"mob-ized" morality. Such morality fears man's in-
stincts for freedom, thus, supressing his conflicting 
will(s) to power and fostering hereditary weakness. 
Accordingly, for Nietzsche, this devitalization of 
the instincts by morality lead to a rigid misinter-
pretation of "the divine." Sacred values came to ex-
press passive nihilism by reducing the conflict and 
chaos of the world, life, and man to the herd's needs 
for formation, stabilization, and order.' 
The genealogy serves as an uncovering of the origi-
nal upsurge in man's awareness of "the divine," of his 
experiences of more-than-human power, and the multiple 
interpretations of these experiences. Yet, Nietzsche 
distinguishes origin from meaning, arche from telos. 
The genealogy accounts for what man's needs for divin-
ity have meant in history, and not for the possible 
value of these needs. The genealogical method, al-
though it sets up the problem of "the divine," is 
inconclusive. Nietzsche's analysis of the passive 
nihilism of some venerations and interpretations of 
"God" is for the sake of a future radical revaluation 
of man, history, and "the divine." Revaluation, for 
Nietzsche, means revitalization of man's will(s) to 
power. Sacred values are no longer meaningful, 7 for 
"God is dead." An onerous image of "God," such as the 
Christian conception, has entombed man's goal behind 
the rock of human inertia. The wonderous-terrible 
questionability and mystery of existence is diminished; 
and, the meaning of the symbols through which man in-
terprets "the divine's" effectiveness in satisfying his 
needs is eviscerated. 
II. The Typology of Pious Persons 
In contrast to monotheism, Nietzsche demonstrates a 
plurality of symbols for "God" among differing peoples, 
times, and individuals throughout history. Entailed in 
the genealogy is thus an analysis of these peoples and 
individuals, their spiritual focus and beliefs, and 
their underlying instincts. This constitutes a typolo-
gy of pious persons. 
Like Xenophanes, Nietzsche, based on his own on-
tology, poses the problem of the meaning of "the 
divine" within the framework of a critique of the sym-
bolisms of Theos. The typology of pious persons is the 
content of this critique. Since God is not a pure 
"thing-in-itseif," the symbols for "God" depend on the 
perspective of the person. God is as He appears to in-
dividual men and women; He manifests Himself in idio-
syncratic terms. The created meaning is self-referen-
tial; man measures his own power correlative to his in-
terpretation of the mightiness of "the divine."* The 
value-perspective thus disclosed reveals what this type 
of individual thinks will give his chaos order, is most 
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meaningful, is life's purpose, and is the goal for 
"man." 
Reverential and religious instincts are the basis 
for man'8 creation of symbols for Theos. These in-
stincts invoke sacrifice and self-overcoming necessi-
tated to increase power. These instincts may be 
ascending or descending in terms of their quanta of 
power. Thus, if a man's conflicting instincts increase 
his quanta of power, his life is ascending, and his 
will is strong. If, however, his instincts foster 
hereditary inertia, then his life is descending, and 
his will is weak. Correlatively, ascending values, in 
expressing the instincts, both preserve and enhance 
life; whereas, descending values, in inhibiting the in-
stincts, may preserve but do not enhance life. An ex-
ample of descending values is the ascetic ideal. The 
ascetic ideal often serves to protect a degenerating 
life from its potential to perish. While the ascetic 
ideal has salvaged man's will from confronting mean-
inglessness, it has exacted a price for this "salva-
tion"—the devitalization of the instincts. This devi-
talization of the instincts is the de-deification of 
man's life. It de-naturalizes and desecrates nature. 
The ascetic ideal is anti-ascending life; it has given 
man an inauthentic goal to will. Yet it has been man's 
only spiritual goal. Thus, the anti-life ascetic ideal 
has killed God. 
Now Nietzsche criticizes not only the ascetic ideal 
as such, the highest ideal of the moral period, but he 
also attacks by degrees the various persons and beliefs 
that exemplify this ideal. Given descending instincts, 
the variety of interpretations are many; however, the 
goal is one—to hide chaos unconditionally. Thus, 
Nietzsche's typology of pious persons is arranged ac-
cording to instincts (descending or ascending) and 
evaluated in terms of quanta of power. Power is the 
criteria; power is the issue. 
The typology is as follows: 
INSTINCTS PERSONS INTERPRETATIONS 
OF "THE DIVINE" 
DESCENDING 
Unconditional 
Love 
De ath, Revenge Paul and 
Christedom 
Buddha 
Jesus 
Otherworld 
Kingdom of God 
Suffering 
ASCENDING 
The Void 
Awe 
Gratitude 
Dionysian Flux 
Life 
Ancient Hebrews 
Noblemen 
Artists 
Overman 
Yahweh 
Greek Gods 
Appearances 
Eternal 
Recurrence 
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This typology accomplishes two things: first, it 
describes various spiritual beliefs, and second, it 
evaluates these phenomena in terms of Nietzsche's 
goal—the enhancement of Will to Power through revalua-
tion. The typology is complex: where there are de-
grees of strength, as with Jesus, this power is appre-
ciated; where there are degrees of weakness, this impo-
tence is depreciated. This typology is not an argument 
for a return to polytheism or previous paganism.* But 
it is an attempt to revalue the reverential and spirit-
ual domain of human existence for the future's sake, 
for Overman's incarnation. 
Since the instincts are the ontological conditions 
for man's life, they constitute the essential subject-
matter of the typographical research which is prepara-
tory for Overman. This study is for the few. It 
requires a new type of discipline—one distinct from 
the ascetic ideal. It requires active nihilism. 1' 
Active nihilism holds the means and methods for a 
new interpretation of "the divine." Active nihilism 
criticizes values, reverses values, and revalues 
values. Those values expressing descending instincts 
and resulting in passive nihilism must be devalued. 
Nietzsche's philosophy, his hammer, however, destroys 
in order to create. There are historical examples of 
sacred symbols which serve as models expressing ascend-
ing instincts, for instance, the Greek gods. Such ex-
amples show the issue at stake. This issue at stake is 
a noble use for "the divine" over and against the 
Christian abuse. Active nihilism creates this higher, 
nobler ideal. For Nietzsche, this ideal can guide 
man'8 will toward a genuinely meaningful future. 
Active nihilism, active revaluation, in contrast to 
passive nihilism, reactive devaluation, analyizes human 
spiritual beliefs in the light of this ideal. 
III. The Revaluation of "The Divine" 
Active nihilism calls for a revaluation of ideals. 
"Holy lies" are the nomenclature of sacred values, 
humankind's ideals. The "holy lie" deceives because it 
forgets or represses some of its conditions. The pur-
pose of the "holy lie" is to make a way of life into, 
something unconscious, spontaneous, and easy. As such, 
"holy lies" guide man's will in a most thorough 
fashion. In evaluating what is greater and more origi-
nal than man, the most-powerful, "the divine," "holy 
lies" symbolize the measure of man. "Holy lies," as 
ideals, in effect, make man's measure livable. 
In discussing "holy lies," what is at stake for 
Nietzsche is not the will to absolute unconditional 
truth, the core of the ascetic ideal, which results in 
atheism. Nietzsche argues against the rigid, moral 
ascetic ideal. "Religions are destroyed by belief in 
morality. The Christian moral God is not tenable: 
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hence 'atheism'—as if there could be no other kinds of 
god." 1 1 Atheism remains as rigid a response to human 
meaning as Christian morality; both fail to appreciate 
the flexible essence of Will to Power. Atheism, there-
fore, is the catastrophe of two thousand years of pas-
sive nihilism, especially of Christianity. The passive 
nihilist, in other words, cannot comprehend the active 
nihilist's revaluation of "the divine." Thus, in mak-
ing blatantly atheistic statements, Nietzsche is him-
self rejecting stagnate symbols for "God" because they 
are not genuine and godly. Contrary to atheism, for 
active nihilism, "holy lies" can perfect a type of man 
through granting him his greatest access to power in-
dividually and culturally. Hence, all man's "holy 
lies" are not to be rejected outright. In part, the 
problem of the meaning of symbols for Theos is what 
kind of "holy lie" man should have, what end "holy 
lies" should serve. 1 1 
For Nietzsche, bad holy lies use the name of God in 
vain. 1' They have killed godliness in and for man. In 
short, some "holy lies" are bad because they weaken 
man; however, other "holy lies" are good because they 
strengthen man. "What is good? Everything that 
heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to 
power, power itself. What is bad? Everything that is 
born of weakness." 1* Nietzsche's criticisms strike at 
all sacred values templed in bad "holy lies." In turn, 
•he praises all "holy lies" insofar as they are good and 
enhance man, preventing him from slipping into inertia 
and disenchantment with life. Nonetheless, Nietzsche 
goes beyond praising and blaming. Man is something to 
be overcome, for man has not brought his chaos into 
order. Man's meaning is more than man; man's measure 
is greater than himself. To destroy the anthropomor-
phic temple of the all-too-human, a new temple, a new 
"ideal" must be set—Overman. 
Overman "embodies" an Aufhebung of man and his in-
terpretations of divintiy. Overman redeems the earth 
from passive nihilism. He is a radicalized appeal for 
the revitalization of man—man's transformation into 
the more-than-human. Overman is the earthly measure of 
man. Being man's measure, Overman may judge all 
mankind's history as ultimately meaningful and of 
worth--it has all lead to him. 
For Nietzsche, therefore, active nihilism destroys 
human inertia in order to prepare for the incarnation 
of Overman. Active nihilism is the means, but extreme 
nihilism is the end. Overman practices extreme 
nihilism. By extreme nihilism, Nietzsche means comple-
tion, the culminating point of history which does not 
terminate in another, better, truer world, but rather 
in a transformed world. 1* This is Overman's world. 
Overman reinterprets values so that the nothingness and 
meaninglessness of man's present values are overcome 
again and again. 
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The piety of Overman is Eternal Recurrence. 
Eternal Recurrence might be called Overman's radically 
revalued "divine lie." The extreme nihilism of 
Overman's view of divinity is "iconoclastic" to man-
kind's senses of "the holy." Thus, Eternal Recurrence, 
mighty be the holiest of "holy lies," and, consequen-
tly, genuinely divine. He who can accept its message 
declares, "You are a god and never before have I heard 
anything more divine. H 1* By contrast to "the great un-
holy lie" of Christianity 1 7 and its will to noth-
ingness, therefore, the "divine lie" of Eternal 
Recurrence saves man's will by willing a telos that 
could be on earth. Accordingly, Overman's revenge-free 
interpretation of the all-powerful divinity of 
Dionysus, and of Will to Power as Eternal Recurrence," 
is Nietzsche's tentative hypothesis for the meaning of 
"the divine." While himself without goal, Dionysus 
lets Overman enjoy his unique power for evaluation and 
self-overcoming for goals. In Eternal Recurrence, ev-
erything, including man, is eternally reborn, eternally 
revalued. Nothing is lost. Thus, man need no longer 
project a short-sighted, linear vision of once-and-for-
all-ness on life and take revenge against life for 
death. Dionysus, God of supreme power, says Yes to all 
of life. He is the divine Yes of everything. 
In conclusion, Eternal Recurrence celebrates the 
victory of the self-overcoming of passive nihilism for 
the unique project and power of meaning in the abundant 
omnipotence of Dionysus. Extreme nihilism, what "might 
be a divine way of thought," 1* perceives that all is 
perspectival. To lie is necessary, for to value is to 
lie; indeed, to create order out of chaos is to lie. 
But, this very creation is divine. 
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